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In many ways China can be seen as the great 
“globalizer”.  Rather than abruptly opening to 
global trade under the “Washington Consensus”, 
beginning in the early 1980s China followed 
the pragmatic expression attributed to its great 
reformer Deng Xiaoping: “cross the river by 
feeling each stone.” China combined opening 
to global trade with significant and gradually 
sequenced government attention to infrastructure, 
industrialization, and logistics to become the 
largest trader on earth in just a few decades.  Such 
an approach will prove even more important as 
China considers the need to globalize its financial 
sector.  The history of other emerging markets’ 
previous experiences with financial liberalization 
offer China some lessons as well.  Fully opening 
the Chinese financial system will require keen 
attention to prioritizing other important reforms 
and to designing a strong and flexible set of cross-
border financial regulations. Such regulations will 
be important to preventing and mitigating financial 
fragility and ensuring that financial markets serve 
the productive employment of the Chinese people.
These words of caution come out of a February 
2014 workshop of the Pardee Task Force for 
Regulating Capital Flows at Boston University. The 
workshop was sponsored by Boston University’s 
Global Economic Governance Initiative, along with 
Columbia University’s Initiative for Policy Dialogue, 
and the Institute for World Economics and Politics 
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It 
brought together scholars and policy-makers 
who discussed experiences with capital account 
liberalization in Japan, India, South Korea, Latin 
America, Central and Eastern Europe and beyond. 
Participants also reviewed the economic evidence 
pertaining to capital account liberalization, as well 
as new policy at the International Monetary Fund 
with respect to financial globalization.
This policy brief synthesizes some of the main 
themes and policy recommendations discussed 
at the workshop and presented in this report, 
though the specific recommendations discussed 
in this brief are our own. The main message is that 
China would do well to draw lessons from both the 
economics literature and country experiences with 
capital account liberalization. Such an approach 
would guide China to adopt a carefully sequenced 
and cautionary approach to capital account 
liberalization. 
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“Fully opening the Chinese financial 
system will require keen attention to 
prioritizing other important reforms and 
to designing a strong and flexible set of 
cross-border financial regulations.”
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regulated by SAFE (State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange) at the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) which was more strict; however, the capital 
flows denominated by RMB were regulated by the 
subsidiaries of Department of Monetary Policy 
II under PBOC, which was much looser. In other 
words, the experiment of RMB internationalization 
opened new loopholes for short-term capital flows 
into and out of China. 
China appears to have re-committed to this exercise 
during its 18th Party Congress in 2013, where China 
said it would work to: 
“Promote bidirectional openness for capital 
markets, raise the extent of convertibility of 
cross-border capital and financial trading, 
establish and complete foreign debt and capital 
flow management systems under prudential 
macro-level management frameworks, accelerate 
the realization of the convertibility of Renminbi 
capital accounts.” (CPC Central Committee, 
2013) 
Therefore, it is not fruitful to debate whether 
China should open its capital account, because the 
decision to move forward already has been made.  
However, it is still vitally important to consider how 
the capital account should be opened, and at what 
pace.
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“It is not fruitful to debate whether 
China should open its capital account, 
because the decision to move forward 
already has been made.  However, it is 
still vitally important to consider how 
the capital account should be opened, 
and at what pace. ”
Capital Account Liberalization in China
 Regulating the inflow and outflow of capital 
has been a cornerstone of China’s development 
reforms.  For more than three decades after Deng 
Xiaoping’s crucial reforms began, China’s capital 
account policies were part of an apparatus to 
direct credit toward strategic development goals 
while maintaining financial stability.  That period 
of economic history in China is among its best 
ever and among the best ever in the world, having 
recorded more than 10 percent income growth 
per year for those decades.  Moreover, its limited 
financial globalization helped keep reforms on 
track. During the 1990s when emerging markets, 
especially in Asia, were wrecked by contagious 
financial crises, China’s relatively closed capital 
account buffered the country from the worst of those 
crises.
Chinese officials have decided that a new 
economic model is needed, and thus China has 
been experimenting with a variety of reforms 
toward that new model.  Gradual capital account 
liberalization started in 1994. Since then, China 
has removed almost all restrictions for inbound 
foreign direct investment and loosened controls 
over portfolio investments —though maintaining 
quota schemes— but cross-border money market 
transactions and financial derivatives have 
remained under strict control. However, as a 
result of RMB internationalization, China’s capital 
account liberalization has accelerated since 2009. 
The RMB trade settlement scheme and so-called 
“recycling mechanism” has led to a significant 
opening of short-term cross-border capital flows. 
The trading of the RMB in Hong Kong has created 
significant opportunity and risk for RMB exchange 
rate arbitrage. Owing to stable RMB appreciation 
expectations, carry trade against the RMB became 
rampant. 
The development of the Hong Kong market along 
with other markets and the partial opening of the 
capital account for short-term cross-border capital 
flows has led some to suggest that China’s capital 
account is even more porous than policy would 
suggest. According to one estimate, China’s gross 
cross-border bank exposure stood at $1 trillion in 
2014, or 12 percent of China’s GDP (verma 2014). 
Since 2009 a new two-track capital flow regulation 
structure has been established. The cross-border 
capital flows denominated by USD were still 
Risks Associated with Capital Account 
Liberalization 
 Theoretically speaking, capital account 
liberalization can bring significant 
benefits to an economy after a nation has reached 
a certain threshold of institutional capabilities 
needed to manage its financial sector. Capital 
account openness can create more financial sector 
competition, can enable portfolio diversification, and 
can provide finance for current account imbalances. 
By the turn of the century many nations from both 
the industrialized and developing world had open 
capital accounts.  
However, according to the economics literature 
there is no clear association between capital 
account liberalization and economic growth in 
emerging markets.  Moreover, there appears to be an 
association between capital account liberalization 
and the incidence of financial crises. Finally, there is 
also evidence that capital account liberalization can 
lead to increased inequality.
Olivier Jeanne, Arvind Subramanian and 
John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics did a comprehensive 
survey of the literature on capital account 
liberalization and economic growth and find that 
there is no clear cut relationship between the 
two.  Indeed, the authors (two of them former 
IMF officials) go so far as to conclude that “the 
international community should not seek to 
promote totally free trade in assets—even over the 
long run—because free capital mobility seems to 
have little benefit in terms of long run growth” 
(Jeanne et al. 2012, 5).  
Columbia University economists José Antonio 
Ocampo, Shari Spiegel and Joseph Stiglitz, as 
well as Harvard University economists Kenneth 
Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart have also shown that 
capital account liberalization is associated with an 
increased incidence of banking crises in a country 
(Ocampo, Spiegel and Stiglitz, 2008; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). Examples of such crises over recent 
decades are Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, South Korea, 
Russia, Iceland, and Latvia. Open capital accounts 
leave emerging markets susceptible to the pro-
cyclical nature of global finance. Short-term capital 
flows occur in surges and sudden stops that can be a 
cause of financial fragility. A surge in capital inflows 
can lead to exchange rate appreciation, a swelling 
of asset prices, and an expansion of bank balance 
sheets given that actors feel that they have more 
collateral at hand for foreign currency denominated 
debts.  All of this can unwind during a sudden stop 
of capital flows:  currencies depreciate significantly 
and balance sheets expand as financial actors still 
need to pay debt in foreign currency (Korinek, 2011).
 Of particular concern for China may be new 
evidence that capital account liberalization can be 
associated with rising inequality.  An IMF study 
written by Furceri and Loungani (2013) examined 
over 50 cases of capital account liberalization in 
advanced economies, and found that inequality 
(as measured by the Gini coefficient) increased by 
approximately one percent during the first year after 
liberalization and by as much as two percent after 
five years.
Government officials and economists also fear 
that capital account liberalization causes a loss in 
policy-autonomy for economic policy-making.  It 
has long been established that policy-makers face 
a “trilemma” when it comes to the capital account.  
The economist Robert Mundel formalized work 
of John Maynard Keynes that established that a 
country can only use two of the three instruments 
commonplace in a world of international finance:  
the use of the interest rate as a monetary policy tool, 
the control of the exchange rate, or the regulation 
of cross-border financial flows. The loss of policy 
autonomy when the capital account has been 
liberalized could be even more severe than Mundel 
proposed, as authorities may lose full monetary 
control and in a sense would be able to choose only 
where they want capital account volatility to be 
reflected: in monetary and credit aggregates, or in 
the exchange rate.  With respect to China, there are 
also significant sterilization costs associated with 
managing the exchange rate with respect to the 
trilemma. 
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“ Open capital accounts leave emerging 
markets susceptible to the pro-cyclical 
nature of global finance.”
Lessons for China:  Reform and Regulate First 
 It will be important for China to sequence 
capital account liberalization in tandem 
with other economic reforms and regulations in 
order to maintain economic growth, productive 
employment, social cohesion, and financial stability 
in the country.  
In terms of sequencing, it will be important to 
reform interest rates and exchange rates before fully 
opening the capital account—especially to short-
term debt, portfolio, and derivatives flows.  very 
low interest rates, coupled with the fact that China’s 
savers will seek to diversify their portfolios as the 
Chinese economy adjusts to re-balancing, may 
bring some risks.  A recent IMF study suggests that 
liberalization could trigger net outflows from both 
equity and bond markets as domestic investors seek 
to diversify large domestic savings (Bayoumi and 
Ohnsorge, 2013).
It will also serve China well to put in place 
significant domestic financial regulations in order 
to maintain financial stability.  Two important 
regulations that need priority attention are the 
implementation of a national deposit insurance 
company to allow for the bankruptcy and liquidation 
of domestic financial institutions.  Another set 
The Importance of Sequencing 
The risks associated with capital account liberalization are unsettling. That is why there is an 
emerging consensus that capital account liberalization, if pursued, should to be sequenced 
according to country-specific characteristics. The International Monetary Fund (2012) 
conducted a thorough re-evaluation of capital account liberalization and the management of 
capital flows from 2010 to 2012 and produced a new ‘institutional view’ on such matters. The 
new view notes that exchange rate flexibility, monetary reform, and financial regulation are 
among the pre-requisites that may be necessary for countries to benefit from capital account 
liberalization. As Kenji Aramaki in this report notes, Japan is considered the exemplar in terms 
of sequencing the opening of the capital account, a process that took over 40 years to complete 
after significant reform of its exchange rate, interest rate, and financial sector policies.
Indeed there is also a growing consensus that the option to regulate cross-border financial flows 
should be a permanent feature of any 21st century financial system, even one that is relatively 
open.  new research in economic theory has stipulated that it may be optimal -- rather than 
distortionary—  to regulate surges in capital inflows.  In the presence of significant information 
externalities, investors do not internalize their contribution to the system risks associated with 
surges and sudden stops. Conditions when numerous market participants make investments 
without incorporating such risks can quickly lead to financial instability. Thus, the case is 
made for counter-cyclical Pigouvian taxes on the inflows of capital in order to correct for such 
inherent market failures in the financial sector (Korinek, 2011).
Most econometric evidence finds that regulations on the inflow of capital can have the desired 
impact if designed and implemented properly. A comprehensive review of the literature 
before the financial crisis—that includes nations with open capital accounts such as Chile and 
Colombia-- for the national Bureau of Economic Research in the United States concluded that 
“In sum, capital controls on inflows seem to: make monetary policy more independent and 
alter the composition of capital flows; to a lesser extent it seems to reduce real exchange rate 
pressures (Magud et al, 2011, 13).”  In the wake of the financial crisis a number of countries 
with open capital accounts have begun to re-introduce regulations on the inflow and outflow 
of capital.  nations such as Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan are among those that 
regulated cross-border finance in the wake of the financial crisis, while maintaining some level 
of capital account openness (Erten and Ocampo, 2013; Gallagher, 2014).
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of policies needed before full capital account 
liberalization is a full-fledged macro-prudential 
regulatory regime to avoid asset bubbles.  Of key 
importance in such a macro-prudential regime 
would be the regulation of the rapidly expanding set 
of shadow banking products in China.
 Counter-cyclical capital flow management 
regulations are needed in tandem with those macro-
prudential regulations. Interest rate and growth 
differentials between China and the rest of the world 
will leave the country susceptible to pro-cyclical 
surges and sudden stops of short-term capital 
flows.  Two countries with open capital accounts, 
Brazil and South Korea, have been pioneering in 
this area. Both countries have pieces of legislation 
that permanently allow the monetary and financial 
authorities to regulate cross-border financial flows 
in a flexible manner on an as needed basis. Both 
countries were struck with significant financial 
crises after they liberalized their capital accounts.  
They thus decided to reintroduce regulations on 
the inflow and sometimes outflow of capital in a 
counter-cyclical manner.  
In recent times, the channels for surges and sudden 
stops of capital flows in Brazil and South Korea have 
been the foreign exchange derivatives market via 
the carry-trade.  Both countries designed regulations 
to attempt to stem the fragility associated with such 
flows.  South Korea’s regulations have been much 
more successful because the derivatives market is 
deliverable and conducted onshore.  Brazil’s market 
is non-deliverable and much of it is conducted 
offshore—making it much more difficult for the 
authorities to regulate.
Finally, it will be important for China to ensure that 
it maintains the policy space to regulate cross-
border finance as needed. Recently, the IMF has 
articulated a new “institutional view” on capital flow 
management that recognizes the need to regulate 
capital flows.  This move has expanded the policy 
space to regulate capital flows in an institution 
that was once very adverse to regulating capital.  
However, certain commitments under the World 
Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, and under some free trade agreements 
and bi-lateral investment treaties make it more 
difficult to regulate cross-border finance (Gallagher 
and Stanley, 2013).  Indeed, the negotiating position 
of the United States under the United States-China 
Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations is that 
China should not be permitted to regulate cross-
border finance without recourse.  In its negotiations 
on an investment treaty with Germany, China was 
able to maintain the policy space to regulate capital 
(Anderson, 2009).  China should seek to strike such 
a balance in all future treaties moving forward.
Chinese authorities have always taken a gradual 
and sequenced approach to the reform process.  It 
is paramount that such an approach be applied to 
capital account liberalization.  Gradual liberalization 
after higher priority reforms that are safeguarded 
by strong regulation of both the domestic financial 
system and cross-border finance is a prudent course 
of action.  In so doing China will not have to learn 
the hard way—as so many other countries across the 
world have-- that premature financial opening can 
lead to financial crises, slow growth, and inequality.  
Such a course of action will maintain China’s tools 
to continue to deliver long-run prosperity for its 
people.
“ Recently, the IMF has articulated a new “institutional 
view” on capital flow management that recognizes the 
need to regulate capital flows.  ”
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